What Should we do about GHGs? Store them or Reduce them?

Some Observations

1. The accumulation of GHGs

Since the mid-19th century, approximately 3,000 billion tonnes of GHGs[1] have accumulated in the atmosphere. Nearly two-thirds (2/3) come from CO₂ emissions, 18% to 20% from methane emissions, and the rest from nitrous oxide (5%) and fluorinated gases (3%). On top of this, some forty billion tonnes of CO₂ are emitted every year.

About half of these emissions have been absorbed by the oceans and terrestrial ecosystems (21% by soils and forests, 29% by the oceans). The rest has accumulated in the atmosphere.

2. Natural carbon sinks are weakening

Terrestrial sinks (forests, permafrost, wetlands, etc.) are now 25% less effective than they would be without climate change, and ocean sinks 7% less effective. Rising temperatures reduce the solubility of CO₂ in warmer waters, and recurring droughts weaken photosynthesis.

The challenge is therefore colossal: every year, ~16 Gt of net CO₂ accumulates in the atmosphere (after absorption by oceans and forests), while current capture technologies remove only about 1 million tonnes — 16,000 times less than what is being added.

3. How can GHGs be eliminated?

Methods for reducing or removing atmospheric CO₂ can be grouped into three broad families: one based on reducing emissions at the source, another based on nature and enhanced natural processes, and a final approach made up of industrial GHG capture and storage technologies, which have been the subject of intense political and economic debate in recent years.

      3.1  Nature-based methods

3.2 Enhanced natural processes

• BECCS — Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage

BECCS is recognized as a negative-emissions technology, because the CO₂ absorbed by trees as they grow offsets the CO₂ emitted by energy production. In 2022, at least five facilities worldwide were using these technologies, capturing about 1.5 million tonnes of CO₂ per year. SirenergiesIFP Energies nouvelles (Sirenergies, IFP Energies nouvelles)

• Ocean Alkalinization 

Ocean alkalinization involves adding basic minerals (for example olivine, lime or carbonates) to directly increase the alkalinity of seawater and thereby enhance its capacity to absorb and durably store atmospheric CO₂. (Ifremer)

• Direct Ocean Capture (electrochemical) 

This technique relies on electrochemical processes that separate seawater into a basic fraction, which is returned to the sea, and an acidic fraction, from which concentrated CO₂ can be recovered and then sequestered or put to use. Laboratory experiments have been conducted at Ifremer since July 2025 to assess the environmental impact of this method. (Ifremer)

• Enhanced Rock Weathering 

Spreading crushed silicate minerals (basalt) on agricultural soils to capture CO₂ as they chemically dissolve.

      3.3. Industrial Technologies

PRIORITIZE THE GHG REDUCTION APPROACH ! 

In contrast to the Canadian position — and that of many other countries and industries — this approach advocates a complete end to the use of fossil fuels and absolute priority for systematic GHG reduction policies, arguing that every additional tenth of a degree of warming makes it harder to preserve the conditions for life on Earth.

If warming exceeds certain thresholds, Earth systems themselves could amplify global warming through thawing permafrost, drying forests and the resulting megafires, or the accelerating loss of Arctic sea ice. The situation would then become truly unmanageable.

The breakneck speed at which the environment has been dropped from the global political agenda is directly proportional to the violence of climate events in recent years. Regional and extra-regional wars that are steadily paving the way for a global conflict, the irrationality of the U.S. government’s political and economic decisions, and the radicalism and dominance of illiberal and authoritarian regimes are taking up all the space in public concerns, and are of course amplified by the echo chambers of social media. We have moved from a paradigm of population well-being to one of the powerlessness of peoples, sustained by a latent eco-anxiety that is absent from the radar of states’ strategic priorities.

In short, the future looks very bleak, and we are shifting from voluntary servitude to willful blindness, living day to day without freaking out too much.

Since facts are stubborn things, every scientist knows full well that the intensity of climate events is only just beginning. “Oh My God!” and “Unimaginable” will continue to top the charts of spontaneous reactions to them.

In this context, putting priority and money on carbon capture and storage looks like a pipe dream, a way of taking a shortcut, or an underhanded approach that allows oil companies not only to keep developing their industry but also to restore their carbon virginity, while sidestepping the strategic problem of solving climate change.

That is why the top priority should be to prevent any increase in GHG emissions, even by a tenth of a degree. If in the late 1970s we spoke of “thinking globally and acting locally,” we must now think “reduce locally to reduce globally.” Because we are stuck in a bad scenario like the one depicted in the film Don’t Look Up or the series Run for Your Life, in which Ben Gazzara seems to have run out of ideas to save humanity.

And yet, solutions exist. In my view, there are three:

Unless one is unaware of what is happening on the planet — notably the war pitting Israel and the United States against Iran — one cannot dispute that it is geopolitically, economically and socially impossible to stop using fossil fuels worldwide by December 2026. December 2027, then, or December 2028? Framing the question this way leads to a dead end, because all industrial sectors run, overall, on fossil fuels — that is, on oil, coal and gas. And all the alternative energies — hydroelectricity, wind, hydrogen, nuclear, biochar, MES, etc. — are not able to replace, ipso facto, the fossil energy mix the world is hooked on. Concretely, if we identify the main producers of fossil energy, we realize that it is structurally essential to the functioning of their economies.

Here is the list of the top 10 producing countries generated by Anthropic’s AI, with the top three accounting for 63% of world production:

1. China — 4,812.6 Mt in total, including 4,402.5 Mt of coal. Its overwhelming lead is explained almost entirely by coal, of which it produces more than half of the world total.
2. United States — 2,277.2 Mt, with a much more balanced output: 948.8 Mt of oil, 854.6 Mt of natural gas and 473.8 Mt of coal. The country is the world’s largest producer of oil (≈20.5% of the total) and natural gas (≈25%).
3. Russia — 1,459.0 Mt, with large volumes in all three categories (523.0 Mt of oil, 509.4 Mt of gas, 426.6 Mt of coal).
4. India — 1,142.8 Mt, more than 95% of it coal (1,085.1 Mt).
5. Indonesia — 921.4 Mt, also driven by coal (836.1 Mt), largely for export.
6. Australia — 614.6 Mt, with 467.7 Mt of coal and a notable contribution from natural gas (128.7 Mt).
7. Saudi Arabia — 594.2 Mt, entirely from oil (512.5 Mt) and gas (81.6 Mt); no coal production.
8. Canada — 489.9 Mt, split between oil (286.9 Mt), gas (156.1 Mt) and a little coal (46.9 Mt).
9. Iran — 457.1 Mt, almost entirely oil and gas (234.5 Mt and 220.5 Mt).
10. South Africa — 234.0 Mt, entirely coal.

It may be surprising that Saudi Arabia ranks only 7th, or that the United Arab Emirates does not appear at all, since popular perception would place them near the top. But that perception rests solely on wealth per capita. Moreover, if only oil reserves were considered, Venezuela would appear in first place.

And if fossil energy production and reserves are combined, the table above is practically identical, except that South Africa is replaced by Venezuela in 10th place.

The so-called “carbon capture and storage” approach requires colossal investments that will come at the expense of the so-called “GHG reduction” approach, and that not only will have no significant short- or medium-term impact in meaningfully reducing the astronomical quantities of GHGs already accumulated, but will not prevent the annual emission of GHGs, which is currently intolerable.

The three solutions proposed above are built around the following arguments:

1. Rebalance the economy–environment pairing: the environment as the market’s preferred partner

The traditional opposition between economic growth and environmental protection rests on an outdated conceptual framework. The environment is not an external constraint to be internalized as little as possible, but the basic infrastructure on which all economic activity depends.

• Systemic, not symmetrical, dependence. The economy depends entirely on natural capital (water, fertile soils, a stable climate, pollinating biodiversity, regulation of the carbon cycle) to function; the reverse is not true. This asymmetry justifies no longer treating the environment as an adjustment variable, but as the very condition that makes economic activity possible.
• The cost of inaction exceeds the cost of action. Economic studies (the well-known 2006 Stern Review, World Bank reports, IPCC reports) converge: the cumulative cost of climate damage and biodiversity loss far exceeds the cost of prevention policies. A structural partnership avoids shifting massive burdens onto future generations.
• Financial risk and “stranded assets.” Markets are gradually factoring in this risk: unexploitable fossil reserves, infrastructure poorly adapted to the future climate, insurance discounts in high-risk areas. Financial institutions (central banks through climate stress tests, prudential regulators) now treat environmental risk as a systemic financial risk — proof that the boundary between economy and environment is already blurring in practice.
• First-mover advantage. Companies and regions that integrate environmental constraints early capture growing markets faster (clean technologies, energy efficiency, bio-based materials) rather than being subjected to a forced transition later under worse conditions. Better to board the train at the station than to have it run us over.
• Correcting a documented market failure. Environmental externalities are not a peripheral “bug” but a major, uncorrected market failure (Pigou, Coase). Rebalancing the pairing simply means making the market work properly by internalizing costs it currently ignores. Obviously, the current U.S. administration’s sweeping environmental deregulation does not help this rebalancing.
• In addition, a distinction must be made between transition costs (real, to be spread out over time) and costs of inaction (cumulative and irreversible). Below, we propose support mechanisms rather than simply tightening regulations without compensation.

2. Put all our eggs in the voluntary and regulated carbon market basket as the economic engine of the energy transition

Carbon pricing, through an organized market, turns an environmental constraint into a price signal that economic actors can act on, steering investment without relying solely on regulatory constraint. The main arguments on this subject are as follows:

• Economic efficiency of the price signal. A carbon market such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) lets each actor choose the least costly decarbonization path for itself, rather than imposing a uniform technological standard. This is a classic principle of allocative efficiency applied to the carbon constraint.
• Endogenous financing of the transition. Revenues from the sale of allowances (in auction-based systems) can be earmarked for low-carbon R&D, social support for the transition, or reductions in other levies — creating a virtuous circle rather than a mere tax.
• Mobilizing private capital. A credible and predictable carbon price reduces uncertainty for investors and channels private capital toward low-carbon assets, multiplying the effect of public funding alone.
• Empirically demonstrated effect. The EU ETS has contributed to a measurable drop in emissions from the European power sector, notably after the strengthening of the market stability reserve, which pushed the carbon price back up after 2018.
• Compatibility with border instruments. Coupled with a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), the carbon market limits carbon leakage and protects the competitiveness of industries subject to the constraint.
• The price floor. A carbon price that is too low or too volatile does not sufficiently encourage long-term investment; hence the debate over price floors and price corridors.
• Integrity risk of offsets. Voluntary carbon markets have been criticized for the low real additionality of some offset projects. But strengthened verification standards adapted to industrial economies can remove this obstacle.
• Distributional effects. It is essential to couple the carbon market with social compensation mechanisms, because without targeted redistribution, the rising cost of carbon weighs proportionally more on low-income households and energy-intensive sectors.
• The need for regulatory complementarity. Most economists now agree that a carbon market alone, whether voluntary or regulated, is insufficient; it must be combined with standards, targeted subsidies and infrastructure planning.

3. Public policies adapted to regional anthropological and ethnographic behavioural cultures

The effectiveness of a public policy depends less on its intrinsic technical design than on how well it fits the social structures, norms of trust, relationships to authority and daily practices of the populations concerned. A universal, one-size-fits-all policy “transplanted” without local adaptation fails far more often than a contextually calibrated one. The main arguments on this subject are as follows:

• Empirical evidence from the failure of uniform policies. The history of international development is full of examples of technically sound but culturally ill-suited programs (agricultural reforms, health programs, microcredit schemes) that failed for lack of consideration of local social structures — solidarity networks, NGOs, gender relations, the role of customary authority.
• Behavioural economics and cultural context. Work in behavioural economics (Thaler, Sunstein, and the World Bank’s field applications — the 2015 report Mind, Society, and Behavior) shows that cognitive biases and decision-making heuristics (Daniel Kahneman) and social norms vary significantly across cultural contexts; a “nudge” (libertarian paternalism) that works in one context may be ineffective, or even counterproductive, in another.
• Governance of the commons. Elinor Ostrom’s exceptional work on collective action and the management of the commons shows that effective management of shared resources (water, forests, fisheries) relies on endogenous local institutions rather than uniform rules imposed from above — a strong argument for grounding public policy design in local realities.
• Legitimacy and buy-in. A policy perceived as external or imposed suffers from a trust deficit that undermines its implementation, even in the absence of open opposition (passive resistance, informal circumvention). Anthropological grounding strengthens social acceptability and therefore the real effectiveness of the measure.
• Diffusion of innovation. The theory of the diffusion of innovations, applied to behavioural change (Carl Rogers), shows that the adoption of new behaviour depends on local social networks and trusted relays (community opinion leaders, influencers, social media) more than on the informational content of the message itself. This is an operational argument for designing public policy campaigns.
• Internal heterogeneity and the evolution of societies must be taken into account. The methodological response is to favour participatory and iterative approaches (co-construction with the populations concerned, up-to-date ethnographic field surveys) rather than static cultural typologies.
• Certain rights or norms (fundamental human rights, minimum health standards) must obviously not be “relativized” in the name of cultural adaptation — contextualization concerns the methods of implementation, not the objectives themselves.

CONCLUSION

The three proposed solutions fit together, I hope, in a logically coherent way: point 1 sets the normative framework (the environment as a partner, not a constraint), point 2 proposes the economic instrument to put it into practice (the carbon market as an engine), and point 3 makes the effective implementation of the first two conditional on public policy engineering that is sensitive to local contexts — without which even the best normative framework and the best economic instrument fail when applied on the ground.

1 The accounting of global emissions is complex and relies on various complementary methods recognized by the scientific community.

AUTHOR

JEAN-FRANÇOIS LÉONARD

Vice-President, Public and Government Affairs at Will Solutions Inc.